In an increasingly crowded and interactive world, there are more and more ways to harm people in an indirect way. These "new harms" (Lichtenberg, 2010, 558) are typically caused by many hands (Thompson, 1980). Many people use too many plastic bags, drive their cars too much, eat too much meat or bluefin tuna, drink bottled water, et cetera. Each individual act has a negligible effect, and may, as a singular act, not be harmful-but the same act performed by millions is. This gap between the (almost or perhaps entirely) harmless singular act and the harmful performance of the same act by many spells trouble for the moral evaluation of these acts and for assigning responsibility.
Introduction
1 In estimated carbon prices deemed necessary for effective mitigation action. 2 There may be objections against using expected rather than actual harm to morally evaluate these actions. It is true that, since the effect of the emissions may not linearly lead to more harm, one cannot claim that each individual emission will certainly lead to actual harm. However, increasing the probability of serious harm occuring in the future is surely morally wrong as well. 3 In Parfit's original example the torturers have 1000 victims, but this is not necessary for my discussion.
unlike the case of carbon emissions, there is no larger individual action pattern that would cause any perceptible effects and could be criticized on the basis of the harm caused, since the torturers will not repeat their action.
The Contradiction
It is useful to make this setting more precise. Let there be a set of individuals labelled . Each individual can perform one of two actions, "contribute" or "not contribute". We denote a contribution by individual with , and no contribution by . There are no other actions available to the individuals, which means that for all . We call the vector of all actions an action profile, while the sum of all contributions is . For simplicity, assume that the individual actions are exchangeable, so that it does not matter who contributes, it only matters how many individuals contribute.
The contributions make an impact , and is strictly increasing in , such that each additional contribution increases the impact somewhat.
The impact can be measured precisely: the voltage, the poison emitted, the temperature increased by greenhouse gas emissions, et cetera. Therefore, one might think that the harm produced can simply be measured directly in terms of the impact.
But this view is mistaken. The impact as such is morally neutral-what is
normatively relevant is how the impact determines a morally relevant property such as harm. What is needed is a bridge principle connecting empirical facts with normative propositions. Hedonists, for instance, take pleasure and pain as morally relevant and say that an impact leads to harm if it increases pain, relative to a baseline. Of course, many other such principles are conceivable and have been discussed, but, for simplicity, I stick with the hedonistic line here. The important upshot is that the impact is causally related to the harm but it is not identical with the harm. Rather, the harm is a function of the impact, . I assume that the harm is weakly increasing in the impact (that is, more impact will either lead to equal or more harm 
Relaxing Direct Act Consequences
In Reasons and Persons, Parfit defines a view very similar to Direct Act Consequences, which he calls the Second Mistake:
to make this distinction. 8 Graff (2001) reviews the main players, but comes to endorse transitivity. "(The Second Mistake) If some act is right or wrong because of its effects, the only relevant effects are the effects of this particular act." (Parfit, 1984, p. 70) Parfit argues that this view is mistaken because it leads to implausible implications in overdetermination cases. To demonstrate, Parfit discusses the famous "Two Assassins". If two snipers shoot at me at exactly the same time and the two bullets pierce my heart such that each of them would have been sufficient to kill me immediately, then each of the two assassins alone is not causally necessary for killing me.
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Parfit's preferred solution for problems of this sort is to suggest that even if individual acts do not produce harm, it is possible that individuals together can create harms:
"(C7). Even if an act harms no one, this act may be wrong because it is one of a set of acts that together harm other people." (Parfit, 1984, 70) 10 This principle states that acts can be wrong because they are part of a set of acts that causes harm, in contradiction to Direct Act Consequences. Even though one single act may be 'harm-less' in the sense of No Stepwise Harm, the set of acts is not. For instance, even if Sinnott-Armstrong's pleasure driver is not causing any harm individually, his driving is part of a set of actions that do cause harm, namely all the acts leading to greenhouse gas emissions. Therefore, relaxing Direct Act Consequences by suggesting a principle along the lines of C7 has some appeal.
One difficulty with notions like "harming together" is to deliver a plausible explanation why the individual acts are impermissible if they cause harm together (Tannsjö, 1989, p. 223) . In addition, note that according to C7 an individual act is not necessarily wrong just because it is part of a harming set of acts. Parfit aims to 9 Not everyone agrees with Parfit that the Second Mistake really is a mistake.
Frank Jackson (1997) maintains that act-consequentialists should hold their nerve: In cases of overdetermination, they should maintain that the single acts are not wrong because they are not causally necessary to bring about the harm. If one wants to defend Jackson's line, it is important to be precise about the setup. In Jackson's discussion of the Two Assassins, it is certain that both of the Two Assassins will shoot, and they shoot independently from each other. In such a case, the action of one assassin alone truly does not cause any harm. Persons, Parfit conditions the obligation on enough but not too many others acting in a similar way and introduces a common knowledge assumption (see C10 on p. 77). In addition, as both Gruzalski (1986) and Otsuka (1991) point out, Parfit's "together" solution crucially depends on two inconsistent claims: that one can determine a most beneficial (and equivalently: least harming) set of actions, while at the same time assuming that adding or withdrawing one contribution makes no difference. These problems remain a challenge for Parfit's view.
Overall, Parfit's proposal for relaxing Direct Act Consequences, while clearly intuitively attractive, has faced objections that have not been fully addressed. Below I will suggest a different way to relax Direct Act Consequences that, I hope to show, holds more promise.
Relaxing the Experienced Harm Assumption
Rejections of Experienced Harm are frequent in the literature. Glover suggests that actions without experienced harm as a consequence are still wrong because they must be understood as producing fractions of perceptible harm:
"[The Principle of Divisibility] says that, in cases where harm is a matter of degree, subthreshold actions are wrong to the extent that they cause harm, and where a hundred acts like mine are necessary to cause a detectable difference I have caused 1/100 of that detectable harm." (Glover and Scott-Taggart, 1975, p. 174) Unfortunately, Glover's argument for the Principle of Divisibility is rather weak: he simply points to the unpalatable implications of rejecting that principle.
More promising are arguments that give us an explanation why actions that do not cause experienced harm can be wrong nevertheless. Several authors have observed that even if the addition of one more actions may not change the perceived harm, at some point the report of the overall level of pain must change. In Parfit's torturer 10 I quote (C7) rather than (C10), as Parfit has retracted on (C10) in his reaction to an argument presented by Gruzalski. See Parfit (1986) and Gruzalski (1986) .
case, every two situations that differ by only one step in the increase of voltage feel exactly the same when compared against each other, but at the same time it must be true that the subjects' experience of pain changes when the voltage gets notched up gradually. If absolutely no property changed while the voltage increases, it could not be true that there is no pain at voltage 0, but tremendous pain at voltage 1000V. The question is which property one should consider to avoid the problem. Kagan considers the subject's pain report:
"At some point the answer to the question "are you in pain?" must differ from the answer given immediately before-otherwise the victim would still be answering "no" at state 1,000 (just as they answered "no" at state 0), something we know to be false." (Kagan, 2011, p. 132) Kagan thus proposes to take the pain report as the relevant property. It is undoubtedly true that when the number of contributions increases, at some number of contributions the impact has increased enough for the experienced harm to be greater than the (lack of) harm at the beginning, that is to say .
From this Kagan infers that "at least one state must feel different from the one that came before" (Kagan, 2011, p. 132) . This last claim, however, is mistaken, and it contradicts what Kagan says earlier about such cases: "each individual act makes no perceptible difference to anyone's pain" (p. 115).
Kagan begins with a careful definition of the morally relevant measure, the perception of pain, only to gradually conflate it with other measures. The fact that reported pain must eventually change between two steps in the increase of voltage simply does not imply that the experienced pain is different between these two steps.
The subject's report can consistently look like this:
…
Step Does the pain feel just like at step ? "Yes"
Are you in pain? "No"
Step : Does the pain feel just like at step ? "Yes"
Are you in pain? "Yes"
At step the subject may be thinking: "This feels just like the last step. But it really does feel painful now, so I say yes to the second question." Despite Kagan's best efforts to convince us otherwise, the subject does not make a mistake in reporting their perception (Nefsky, 2011) . What would be mistaken is the belief that nothing has changed -but that does not entail that the subject must therefore be able to distinguish the pain perception of step and in direct comparison.
Similar claims can be defended in analogous settings. Arguably, one can gradually change the temperature such that a subject can never tell the difference between any two notches, one can gradually fade from one color to another such that each two adjacent shades are indistinguishable, and so on. This does not prevent the subjects from realizing along the way that certain variables have changed. They begin to notice pain, they notice that the water that was cold at the beginning is now lukewarm, or that the green is now orange. What they cannot do is distinguish between adjacent steps. Consequently, they also cannot pinpoint the precise step where the change has taken place -even though they do notice the change.
What Kagan effectively proposes is a revision of Experienced Harm. Instead of considering experienced harm, he suggests considering harm reports. And since contributions are typically made under conditions of imperfect information, any contribution has a small probability to change the harm reported, such that the expected reported harm is positive for all contributions.
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Another way to revise Experienced Harm is to appeal to properties that are accessible by theoretical reasoning (Hansson, 1999; Shrader-Frechette, 1987) .
Provided that the subjects are well-informed about the setup, they know that even though they cannot feel a difference in pain when the contribution level changes slightly, they still know that the impact on them has changed. In case of the harmless torturers one could think about the subjects sitting in front of a voltmeter with very high measurement resolution, displaying the current voltage. One contribution is added. The subjects do not feel any difference, but they do see the increased voltage on the voltmeter. From this they infer that it has become more likely that their pain perception will change once further contributions are added.
Extending our limited cognitive abilities by theoretical reasoning or by measurement instruments is common in science and in everyday life. Suppose I cut a piece of butter into two equal halfs. They feel equally heavy to me. However, 11 A related, probabilistic version along the same lines was given earlier by Voorhoeve and Binmore (2006) and by Arntzenius and McCarthy (1997) .
theoretical reasoning tells me that with a probability infinitely close to 1, one piece must be a tiny bit heavier than the other, and a sufficiently precise scale will tell me which one this is. It would be crazy to maintain that we should end the inquiry by insisting that the two lumps of butter are equally heavy because they feel equally heavy. And perhaps we should also use suitable reasoning and measurement tools to get a better empirical access to the causal process that leads to the harm the subjects are experiencing in our problem. That means that we should stop taking phenomenally experienced harm as the relevant wrong-making property; instead we should consider variables such as "contribution to the impact leading to harm". 
Relaxing the No Stepwise Harm Assumption
The only sub-clause of No Stepwise Harm that can plausibly be relaxed is (iii): that any single additional action does not cause any experienced harm, given all other actions.
A first revision would move from perceived harm to perceivable harm.
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Proponents of this revision can concede that the subjects do not actually experience any difference in pain when one contribution is added or removed. They do maintain, however, that the subjects are mistaken in claiming that the pain is the same, and that the subjects would be able to notice the difference under ideal conditions of perception. Therefore, there is a perceivable, though unperceived, difference in harm whenever the level of contribution changes. I am unsure how to understand this argument. It may be that the difference becomes perceivable by using theoretical knowledge or tools of measurement as discussed in the previous section. If that is the case, the proposal looks like a revision of Experienced Harm, as discussed above.
Or it may be that the subjects perceive the difference without awareness, but are able to become aware of the differences (Mills, 2002, p. 392) . That latter claim is an empirical speculation, and there is no reason to believe that it would hold for extremely small differences in impact. The inductive premise, by contrast, implies this:
(1) entails (2) only if the relation is transitive. But it is the transitivity of that I deny.
Transitivity is often assumed without explicit argument because we tend to think about similarity relations in terms of equivalence relations or as the symmetrical part of a weak order. Moreover, transitivity is a fundamental rationality constraint for preferences. In the context of preferences it should not be abandoned lightly. In the context of perception, however, it is far from clear whether transitivity in similarity judgements obtains empirically. Also, unlike in the preference case, it is not a fundamental rationality constraint. Thus, assuming non-transitivity for similarity of harm perceptions is much less objectionable.
Two implications follow immediately. First, we can now account for the plausible claim that individuals cannot perceive a difference in harm if the difference in impact is very small. Second, this does not lead to a sorites paradox because the nontransitive pairwise rankings in (1) are weaker than the inductive premise required to set up the paradox. In particular, from the fact that for any it does not follow that for any is also the motivation behind Parfit's solution). Therefore, it is useful to consider minimal perceptible subsets of the set of all actions. Minimal perceptible subsets are those sets that contain just enough actions such that together these actions avoid minimal change insensitivity -they can jointly make a perceptible difference. More specifically, if all actions in a minimal perceptible subset change from "not contribute" to "contribute" (or vice versa), the victim notices a difference.
14 Consider individual i's action ai. This action is an element in some of the minimal perceptible subsets. Each set can make a difference to harm if all actions in the set change from "not contribute" to "contribute" (and vice versa). Action ai therefore contributes to expected harm together with others in a minimal perceptible subset if (i) ai is "contribute" and (ii) there is a positive ex ante probability that all others actions in the set (except ai) are "contribute" and a positive probability that they are all "not contribute". Condition (i) checks whether the individual contributes; condition (ii) whether there is a positive probability that the minimal perceptible subset can make a difference.
Crucially, whether ai is in the position to increase expected harm depends on the joint probabilities of the other actions. If ai cannot make a difference to the consequence this subset of actions has because, for example, other actions are fixed, then ai does not increase expected harm by contributing with regard to that set. And if ai cannot contribute to a difference in any of the minimal perceptible subsets it is an element of, then it does not increase expected harm at all.
A solution along the lines sketched here will have to revise Direct Act
Consequences by incorporating a non-standard conception of consequences. This non-standard conception will have to say that contributing in suitable minimal perceptible subsets has the consequence of increasing expected experienced harm.
This, in turn, will allow us to say that actions that are individually imperceptible are still wrong because they are expected to bring about harm together with other actions.
For example, the action of pushing a button in the harmless torturers setting leads to increased expected experienced harm for the victim. Even though the action does not by itself increase experienced harm, the action is expected to do so in the following sense: the action (to contribute to the voltage) will be part of minimal perceptible subsets of contributions such that the actions of these subsets together can be felt by the victim. And since there is a positive probability that all the actions in the subsets are "not contribute" or "contribute", there is a positive probability that these subsets can make a difference. For instance, suppose that the victim always experiences additional pain if two more torturers push the buttons, but never if just one additional torturer pushes the button. This means that the button pushing of one torturer is part of subsets with two elements that can be felt. And since there is a positive probability for a subset to make a difference in harm, contributing within such a subset leads to expected harm when adopting the non-standard notion of consequences suggested in this section.
The solution sketched offers a suitably differentiated account of cases where the choices of other agents are either truly agential free choices, and cases where the other contributions are fixed (and therefore not subject to choice). Suppose a single torturer shows up for work (cf. Parfit, 1984, p. 81) and, as introduced above, 999
buttons are already pushed so that the victim suffers severe pain. If pushing or not pushing the button is the only available action, is it permissible to push one more button? Parfit is inclined to say "no", as he thinks that the "second mistake" is indeed that: a mistake. But according to my proposal, the single push of the button has a zero expectation to contribute to harm, and is therefore permissible. The reason is that while such an action is a member of minimal perceptible subsets, the probability that any of these subsets will jointly make a perceptible difference is zero, as all the other actions are fixed. Similar implications follow for other determined processes. If one pours a pint of water into a devastating flood and the amount of floodwater is already fully determined, this action is permissible. But it is not permissible if the amount of floodwater is not fully determined and one's pint could with some non-zero probability make a difference in combination with other stochastic processes (and this is the more realistic setting in the real world). These examples show that the solution I sketch here will also have to revise Contribution is Wrong: contributions are only wrong if they cause an increase in expected experienced harm, if they cannot make a difference to expected harm they are permissible.
Unlike Kagan, I do not rely on any actual thresholds being crossed by any specific contributing individual. In particular, I do not have to claim that, at some point, the action of one individual must trigger harm. And, again unlike Kagan (p. 130), I do not have to deny the existence of genuine imperceptible effects cases. In fact, my proposal shows that Kagan's claim "that there could not possibly be cases of imperceptible difference" (p. 130) is false. There can be cases of imperceptible difference if the relevant relation is non-transitive because of insensitivity. My solution can therefore preserve the empirically and conceptually plausible assumption that there exist changes in impact so small that they never register as additional harm.
Towards the end of the paper, Kagan admits that the differences from notch to notch may not be "directly" (p. 137) perceivable. If he weakens his view in that way, however, he concedes that one single action can be imperceptible, undermining his central conceptual claim. In any case, in his final discussion Kagan vacillates between denying No Stepwise Harm and denying Experienced Harm.
Conclusion
The hardest many hands problems are those where each individual action does not 
